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Abstract. The paper aims to link three prominent issues relevant to the financial 
world today – the mounting level of financialization, heterodox perspective on 
functionless investors, and compatibility of Islamic principles to heterodox thinking 
particularly in regards to interest and uncertainty. Examining the vast array of 
burgeoning literature the paper argues that the trend of financialization in the 
capitalist countries has created a new class of capitalist with huge accumulation of 
wealth ensued merely from financial transactions. Income gap between the rich and 
poor has widened which is at odd with heterodox perception of equality among 
social classes. In the Marxian and Keynesian traditions, there is little room for 
functionless investors to expropriate surplus earned by working and entrepreneurial 
classes particularly through financing means or rent. We find Islamic prohibition of 
interest and uncertainty compatible with this heterodox thesis. Islam does not allow 
rentier income from interest; rather it encourages profit and loss sharing financial 
contracts so that uncertainty involving with the future income is shared by 
contracting parties. 
Keywords. Financializaiton, Heterodox economics, Islamic finance, Interest, 
Uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
he words „neoliberalism‟, „globalization‟ and more recently 
„financialization‟ are commonly used to characterize the change the 
world has been undergoing over the last few decades (Foster, 2007; 
Epstein, 2005). Specially, after the bubble burst in the US housing and stock 
markets which resulted worldwide financial crisis, scholars are paying 
greater attention to dissect the role of finance in creating and maintaining a 
new form of capitalism called financialization. The term „financialization‟ 
can be defined as a pattern of accumulating profits through financial 
channels rather than the traditional means of trade and commodity 
(Krippner, 2005) or a shift of economic epicenter from industrial to finance 
capitalism (Foster 2007). Owning to its greater presence in every sphere of 
economy, financial market has become the pace-setters of all markets as 
wealth effect, positive and negative, play a crucial role in economic cycle, in 
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which „gambling with analysis, advice, appraisal, advertising, and 
commission-charging becomes a major growth industry‟ (Dore, 2000:6). 
Moreover, finance as capital input for the productive economy is no longer 
dominant; rather it has been transformed into a mechanism which helps 
capitalists establish greater influence on economic policies and outcomes for 
accumulating their wealth. 
Wealth concentration through financialization invites many adverse 
social consequences including inequality and unfairness. Stiglitz laments the 
current high level of inequality that has emerged in a capitalist country like 
USA. He reports that while some thirty years ago the top one percent of 
income earners received only 12 percent of the nation's income, the disparity 
has grown so dramatically that by 2007 the average after-tax income of the 
top one percent had reached $1.3 million, but that of the bottom 20 percent 
amounted to only $17,800. It implies that “the top 1 percent get in one week 
40 percent more than the bottom fifth receive in a year" (Stiglitz, 2012: 4). 
Stiglitz (2012:8) further notes „both the magnitude of America's inequality 
today and the way it is generated actually undermine growth and impair 
efficiency. Part of the reason for this is that much of America's inequality is 
the result of market distortions, with incentives directed not at creating new 
wealth but at taking it from others‟. 
Wealth creation requires investment in real economy. However, the 
process of financializationhelps elites accumulate huge pile of capital from 
financing activities rather than investing in traditional production and 
investment in tangible assets. In the Keynesian perspective this capitalist 
class can be termed as „rentier‟ or „functionless investor‟ who „… generates 
income via his ownership of capital, thus exploiting its “scarcity-value” 
(Epstein & Jayadev, 2005: 48). They tend tosqueeze those living at the 
bottom of population pyramid constituting the foundation of consumption 
and expenditures. Declining income for the bottom class means declining 
expenditure for consumption goods leading to further reduction of 
investment in the real economy. Rates of employment and wage fall as a 
result. Maintaining the consumption level withdeclining absolute wage 
requires debt to incur at both national and individual levels. A growth regime 
that relies heavily on debt critically undermines its own liquidity and 
solvency leading to a vicious cycle of „systemic fragility‟ due to Keynes and 
Hyman Minsky. The current financial meltdown triggered primarily by US 
subprime mortgage crisis is the inevitable result of increased trend of 
financializaton (Lapavitsas, 2009). Describing this crisis a „marginal 
moment‟, Sotiropoulos et al. (2013) urge economists to rethink about the 
workings of contemporary capitalism. Notwithstanding, it seems that our 
economic society has not yet come towards the feasible direction for 
transcending capitalism, in particular, transcending the trend of 
financialization. 
In this paper, we take the view of heterodox school including the 
economics of Keynesain, Post-Keynesian and Marxian traditions to describe 
the elements and process of financialization and its perilous effects on real 
economy. Heterodox school is very concerned about social justice of 
tackling our economic society's arbitrary and inequitable distribution of 
wealth and income. The school believes that financialization in the capitalist 
economy will eventually lead the emergence of a capitalist or rentier class 
that will focus on accumulation by fostering financial profit at the excuse of 
scarcity of capital (Lapavitsas,2011). Consequently, investment in the real 
sector will decline leading to poor performance in output and growth. This 
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implies that functionless investors will gain at the expense of other classes in 
the production system (labor, managers, and entrepreneurs) resulting social 
inequality and unrest. 
Keynes (1936: 344) argues that „the owner of capital can obtain interest 
because capital is scarce… but there are no intrinsic reasons for the scarcity 
of capital.‟ For Keynes, interest cannot be the price of financial capital 
because the rate of interest depends on the monetary supply and the demand 
which is based upon (1) the income level and (2) the liquidity preference of 
holders. Therefore, interest can be kept at a minimum level, even zero at the 
extreme case, if a state of full employment is realized. We show that these 
heterodox traditions have compatibility with the principles of Islamic 
finance. Islamic prohibition of Ribaand Ghararis an important tool for 
taming down the wild nature of financialization and its increased focus on 
rent-income. Moreover, Islamic financing system provides very limited 
scope for functionless financiers to be benefited from guaranteed income 
without sharing risk associated with investment. 
The paper has been structured as follows: section two briefly describes 
the process of financialization and its aftermath reflecting the current 
financial crisis. Section three examines the heterodox view on 
financialization and its prescribed mechanisms to neutralize the trend of 
financialization. Finally, section four checks the principles of Islamic finance 
and its compatibility with the heterodox view which is followed by 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Financialization 
Daniel Bell (1973) indicated, in the early of 1970s, the imminent shift of 
society from the traditional mode of production and distribution to a new 
form which he termed „post-industrial‟ society. The society can be 
characterized by the emergence of a new class of ruling elite who will be 
able to establish influential power on economic policy-making. Moreover, 
the focus of economic activities will be shifted from primary or 
manufacturing to tertiary sector; therefore, service is considered the modus 
operandi in the post-industrial society which gradually takes the place of 
industry as the engine of growth. The supremacy of service over other 
spheres of economic activities will provide finance a competitive edge and 
greater scope to grow. Capitalizing on this opportunity the rentier classwill 
emerge who are basically the owners of financial firms and holders of 
financial assets. 
Financialization, particularly in the capitalist countries, began to grow at 
a noticeable scale in the final quarter of the twentiethcentury when industries 
in those economies faced tremendous competitive pressure from rest of the 
world owning to the nascent pace of globalization (Arrighi, 1994). In 
response to this threat and a way of boosting their already declining profit 
due to competition, firms started shifting their investment and operations 
from production to finance. This transformation has bestowed rentiers with 
enormous influential power over regulatory authority to mould economic 
policies and structures for their interests (Jayadev & Epstein, 2005). 
Monetary policy was the key target to functionless investors through which 
they were able to keep the real interest rates high aiming at reducing budget 
deficits to curb inflationary pressure and repressing labor force that threatens 
to limit their share of rents. Kalecki (1943:325) argues that if the government 
aims for an expansionary monetary policy to maintain the high level of 
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employment „a powerful alliance is likely to be formed between big business 
and rentier interests, and they would probably find more than one economist 
to declare that the situation was manifestly unsound.‟ In such a way they 
have successfully promoted financial liberalization yielding them more room 
for making profit at home and abroad. 
Economic and financial deregulation was followed by an increased 
involvement of corporations with borderless transactions including 
international borrowing and lending. These transactions are associated with 
greater risk of foreign exchange and interest rate fluctuations. Thanks to 
financial innovation, institutions involved with such transactions found a 
way to replace traditional mode of originate-and-hold financing with new 
originate-and-distribute technique. Lending institutions, insurance 
companies, brokerage house, hedge and private equity funds, mutual and 
pension funds packaged and repackaged certain pools of financial assets by 
slicing and tranching them into new securities and issued to investors with 
surplus funds. This easy originate-and-distribute notion of lending and 
borrowing facilitated credit expansion to such a level that many economies 
did not afford to sustain the heat. Foster (2007) notes that the US debt in 
1985 estimated to be twice of GDP which rose to three and half times merely 
two decades letter. Once the prime lending market became saturated, 
financial institutions started extending long term credit to non-prime 
borrowers forgetting fundamental uncertainty associated with movement of 
interest rate. Moreover, the originate-and-distribute concept of financing 
made it very difficult for regulatory authority to trace credit risk for framing 
appropriate countermeasures. 
The growing pace of financialization helped financial industry contribute 
a larger share of the national GDP while accumulating their wealth through 
profits from interest, dividends and capital. Dore (2008) shows that the profit 
earned by the US financial corporations as proportion to national income 
averaged 9.5 percent during 1950s which rose to 45 percent in 2002 and it 
continued growing at an average of 16.7 percent annually between 2000 and 
2006. In the similar fashion, income from financial activities has outpaced 
the real income (income from production and manufacturing) for all 
developed nations. Epstein & Jayadev (2005) report that between the 1960 
sand 1970s, on the one hand and the 1980s and 1990s on the other 
hand,rentier shares of national income made a significant increase in most of 
the OECD countries. Besides financial institutions, participation of non-
financial institutions in financial activities has increased significantly which 
eventually hastened the speed of financialization. Moreover, they played 
double roles here - derived profit from financial activities as well as paid 
substantial portion of their total expense in the form of interest, dividends, 
and share-buy-backs. Crotty (2005) finds that the payments to financial 
sectors (interest, dividend, and share buybacks) by non-financial firms as a 
proportion to cash flow accounted for 20 percent in 1960s and 30 percent in 
the 1970s 75 percent (at its peak) in 1990. As the cycle goes on gearing up 
more financial activities and profit thereof, available funds for investment in 
tangible assets are drained from real to financial markets. Moreover, 
financial innovation including options, swaps, futures, forwards and other 
toxic intangible derivative products most of which are over the counter 
(OTC) traded derivatives made the financial markets more attractive to both 
financial and non-financial firms. Crotty (2008) shows that the notional 
value of all derivative contracts rose from about three times of globalGDP in 
1999 to over 11 times in 2007. 
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Of course, functionless investors depend on people engaged in productive 
activities for their income and wealth (by dint of ownership, lending, and 
such other means). As such, the former, powered by shareholders „value-
maximization‟ proposition aiming at reducing principle-agent problem, 
creates remarkable pressure on the latter to increase and distribute profits. 
The fundamental concept at the core of agency problem that shareholders of 
modern firms are dispersed and firms run by professional managers has 
eroded in the age of financialization. Instead, institutional shareholders have 
taken their place with their growing presence in the financial markets. 
Jacoby (2008) explains the growth of institutional equity holding in the USA 
showing that in 1960 institutional investors owned 12 percent of equities 
which rose to 45 percent in 1990 and finally peaked at 61 percent in 2005. In 
2007, institutional shareholders owned 68 percent of the 1000 largest US 
corporations (Jacoby, 2008). 
Large amount of corporate shareholding by pension funds, mutual funds, 
private equity, and insurance companies has bestowed them with enormous 
power and latitude to exercise more pressure on corporate management than 
ever before. This tension, in turn, forces corporate manager to focus 
intensely on profit maximization. To attain the desired objective, managers 
sometimes shy away from long term investment in the real sectors which 
offers meager return and rather search for scopes and opportunities that will 
help boosting firm‟s bottom line even in the short-term. Stockhammer 
(2012) shows that investment to operating surplus declined in major 
developed countries during the last three decades which he attributes to the 
shareholder value orientation and increase uncertainty. Moreover, managers 
attempt to shed off underperforming branches of the firm in attempts to raise 
the networth of the corporation and other restructuring activities including 
mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts as well as the 
outsourcing of productiveactivities (Davis et al., 1994). Profit earned by 
these means ultimately goes to wealthy accumulators. Foster (2007) reports 
that the top one percent holders of financial assets in the USA hold more 
than four times of as much as the bottom 80 percent holders. He further 
asserts that shareholding by nation‟s richest one percent of the population is 
estimated to be equal to the shareholding of the remaining 99 percent. 
Moreover, a larger pie of the profit earned by corporations goes to the 
pocket of firms‟ top executives in the form of incentives and bonuses. Crotty 
(2008) shows that top executives of many banks and other financial 
institutions materialized lavish pay even at the time of crisis when many 
workers lost their means of livelihood. This proves that the victory of the 
rentiers has come at the expense of wage-earners and households, who have 
faced stagnating real wages and increased indebtedness. Stockhammer 
(2012) reports that the median weekly wages in the United States have 
grown by a mere 2.8 percent from 1980 to 2005, the bottom quartile of 
wages fell by 3.1 percent and the top10 increased by 21 per cent. Like USA, 
real wage has been falling across Europe as well as in Japan. Skewed 
distribution of income and wealth results social inequality leading to a 
fragile and unsustainable economic system. Thus, the influence of 
functionless financiers who accumulate wealth merely through financing 
means should be curbed to a reasonable extend to avoid those undesirable 
social consequences. The question is how? Heterodox school provides an 
important insight toward the issue. 
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3. The Heterodox Perspective on Financialization 
Contemporary heterodox approaches are very much concerned about the 
rising predatory version of capitalism and its embedded tendency towards 
crisis. Economists believing in this school cast shadow on the capitalist 
society where successful participation in social affairs depends less on a 
person's abilities and skills and more on possession of money- 
Modern capitalism has become a complex game, and those who win at 
it have to have more than a little smarts. But those who win at it often 
possess less admirable characteristics as well: the ability to skirt the 
law or to shape the law in their own favor: the willingness to take 
advantage of others, even the poor; and to play unfair when necessary. 
As one of the successful players in this game put it, the old adage 
"Win or lose, what matters is how you play the game" is rubbish. All 
that matters is whether you win or lose. The market provides a simple 
way of showing that - the amount of money that you have (Stiglitz, 
2012: 37-8). 
Differentiating itself from the dominant neoclassical thesis, the heterodox 
school explains economic system by its relationship between and among 
parties engaged in producing goods and services for society „... to meet 
requirements of those who participate in its activities‟ (Lee, 2009: 8). The 
participatory groups are productive classes comprising of entrepreneurs or 
top managers and workers or earning class. Marx is very outspoken about 
class system and its indispensible outcome to the society. He explains a state 
of production as mixed of dead and living labor. The former is the labor 
embedded in the means of production and the latter expended by workers 
during the production process. The dead labor, in the Marxian tradition, 
appears as an alien and hostile power as capital but eventually establishes its 
overall dominion on living labor. The superiority of capital over labor 
facilitates the exploitation of labor by capital. Marx states that labors‟ 
economic circumstances or sometimes economic coercion forces them to 
accept the subordination to capital. Economic coercion might construe the 
abuse of worker‟s own rights on his labor because capitalists not only 
appropriate part of what the workers have produced but also abrogate their 
freedom and autonomy. In Marxist language, dead labor dominates living 
labor at the end (Elster, 1986). 
For Marx, a person is exploited if he performs more labor than is 
necessary to produce the goods that he consumes. If he actually produces his 
own consumption goods, the criterion for exploitation is simply whether he 
also produces goods to be consumed by others. This scenario is captured by 
his labor theory of value. The rate of exploitation is considered as the ratio 
S/V, where S represents surplus value which is the difference between the 
value the worker produces in a given period and the value of the 
consumption goods needed to sustain him/her for that period, V represents 
variable capital which is the labor value of the labor power of the workers 
employed in the production process. In Marx's view, the labor power of the 
worker is produced out of the goods he/she consumes, therefore the labor 
value of his/her power is defined by the labor value of these goods, which 
he/she consumes in fixed proportions just as production takes place with 
fixed proportions of inputs (Elster, 1986, p. 67). Constant capital denoted 
here as C is the labor value of non-labor means of production, such as 
machinery, buildings, raw materials that have already been refined by labor. 
The organic composition of capital, a rough measure of capital intensity, is 
the ratio C/V. The rate of profit is the ratio S/(C+V). Dividing the numerator 
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and the denominator in the rate of profit by V yields: the rate of profit = 
(S/V) / (C/V +1). Or in other words, the rate of profit = the rate of 
exploitation/ (the organic composition of capital + 1). The tendency of 
capitalists to substitute dead labor for living labor to increase profit will 
necessitate the innovation of labor-saving technology. Innovation to be 
labor-saving means that there is an increasing organic composition of 
capital. This follows that capitalist must increase the level of exploitation 
(called as the rate of surplus value mainly including interest and rent) to 
avoid any decline in profit in the Marxian equation or it should be increased 
to revert the trend of profit upward. This implies that increasing exploitation 
is considered one of core processes in the mode of capitalism in the Marxian 
tradition. 
Marx further notes that a capitalist society is featured by the main 
relationship of exploitation and class between worker and capitalist. In 
societies where this is an example of dominant relation, there exists a 
relation of indebtedness arising in the credit market. Marx argues referring to 
the pre-capitalist society that the class struggle resulted from the conflict 
between debtor and creditor. The usurer's capital which has the mode of 
exploitation of capital without its mode of production was pervasive in that 
stage of society (Elster, 1986: 86). However, the trend has been continuing at 
an increasing pace and becomes the fundamental building block of 
financialization in the modern capitalist world. Exploitation through usurer's 
capital or financial capital, according to Marx, gives no impetus to the 
development of the productive forces. A functionless investor has neither the 
incentive nor the opportunity to improve the methods of production because 
he is not the residual claimant. From this perspective, Marx argues that it is 
unfair that some should be able to earn an income without working, whereas 
others must accept the toil of hard work. Capitalist extraction of surplus 
value is therefore equivalent to theft, embezzlement, robbery, and stealing 
(Elster, 1986: 95). 
Like Marx, Keynes argues that usurers or the suppliers of capital retain 
the cumulative oppressive power and uses it to exploit the scarcity-valueof 
liquid capital (Keynes 2008: 344). For Keynes, economic growth could be 
better satisfied if capital ceases to be scarce. If so, interest rate cannot be 
considered as the price for supply of capital. He establishes the relationship 
between savings, investment, and rate of interest stating that saving depends 
on the level of investment which in turn, depends on the rate of interest 
(Minsky however, points out that Keynes misses two important elements – 
asset price level and financial commitment by financial institutions- in 
determining the demand for money). To achieve full employment by 
ensuring sufficient investment, Keynes advocates for realization of a low rate 
of interest „… it is to our best advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that 
point relatively to the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital at which 
there is full employment‟ (Keynes, 1936: 343). The question is: how low 
should be the rate of interest? Should it ultimately be zero? 
From the perspective of Keynes, the answer is affirmative, provided that 
the low rate of interest brings full employment. According to Keynes, the 
scale of investment depends on the relation between the rate of interest and 
the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital. In theory, a lower rate of 
interest, zero rate of interest at the extreme case, would encourage the 
borrowers (mainly enterprises) to make more investment so far as their 
prospective yield of the investment remains unchanged (the marginal 
efficiency of capital in the general theory depends on the relation between 
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the replacement cost [the supply price of a capital asset] and its prospective 
yield. It is worth noting that the marginal efficiency of capital is still subject 
to the subjective swings of mood of the borrower). 
However, the scale of investment is not always promoted by a low rate of 
interest as assumed in the general theory. Despite the availability of 
sufficient funds, screening and monitoring activities by (functional) lenders 
and investors still matter in order to respond to the general uncertainty from 
which lenders suffer, and thereby contribute to the optimal allocation of risk 
funds. For the banks as financial intermediaries, their nominal net profit 
from lending (particularly the „floating rate‟ lending) is not affected by the 
change in the market reference rate (the funding rate for the banks), so far as 
the spread margin as risk premium towards the borrowers remains 
unchanged and the loan exposure remains the same. In other words, banks' 
net profit from the floating rate lending is affected only if (1) the banks 
consider the borrowers' lowered funding cost to reasonably lower their 
probability of default (to increase their probability of success), then the 
banks are willing to increase the loan exposure towards the borrowers when 
higher risk-adjusted returns are expected, and (2) the borrowers increase the 
demand of fund-raising for their investment. The above (1) is related to the 
banks' subjective judgment of screening and monitoring, while the above (2) 
depends on the borrowers' subjective sentiment of investment. 
Second, we should ask how a low rate of interest can attract the ultimate 
fund providers. In the Marxian tradition, the analysis of banking credit and 
interest is undertaken on the basis of Marx's approach such that stagnant (or 
idle) money is systematically generated in the course of industrial 
accumulation, transformed into interest-bearing capital by the credit system 
and returned to accumulation to receive a share of surplus value (Itoh & 
Lapavitsas, 1999: 61). The money capital accumulated through the sale of 
commodity capital as well as the hoard of temporarily idle money of the 
industrial and commercial capitalists, workers, the state or anyone else are 
collected and centralized in the financial institutions, and transformed into 
potential money capital available to industrial capital (Fine & Saad-Filho, 
2004). Needless to say, a lower (or zero) rate of interest would be less 
attractive to the idle money holders. Less money capital available to 
industrial capital would be less contributing to the capital accumulation for 
the society. 
In the Marxian tradition, the differences between industrial capital and 
interest-bearing capital (IBC) are illustrated by respective circuits; it is 
widely known that industrial capital is expressed by M [money capital] - C 
[commodity inputs] - M' [money capital plus surplus value] for which 
money intervenes in the processes of production and exchange. In contrast, 
IBC is represented by M - M', where money stands apart from these 
processes (Marx 1981; Fine & Saad-Filho, 2004). In the conventional credit 
relationship between lender and borrower, the former realises the interest 
and the latter the profit of enterprise that remains, after the payment of 
interest, from the surplus value produced through the use of the borrowed 
money capital. It is worth noting that Marx emphasized that the price of the 
interest rate is „irrational‟, since it bears no relation to any underlying 
production conditions. It depends on the competitive relations governing the 
classes of borrowers and lenders (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2004: 142-3). In the 
same token, Keynes argues that the rate of interest is not a reflection of 
return to savings (or price for sacrificing future consumption); rather it is a 
reward to savers for losing control over liquidity at present. In this sense, the 
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liquidity preference of savers should have an important bearing in 
determining the actual rate of interest assuming capital is not scarce. 
Like Marx, Keynes argues that capital is not as productive as labor. Thus, 
he acclaims entrepreneurs as well as efforts of labor and discourages the role 
of absentee owner because their income requires no genuine sacrifice. 
Keynes further views that the inequality of income that results from 
enterprise is desirable. However, inequality of income that results from 
ownership of wealth (the income of rentiers) is undesirable (Minsky, 1975). 
Both Marx and Keynes are very optimistic that the phase of capitalism will 
be over because For Marx, capitalism produces its own gravediggers (labor 
unrest and the resulting revolution) and for Keynes, capitalism is a 
transitional phase which will disappear when it accomplishes its work. 
Surprisingly enough, the phase is not over yet; but rather the influence of 
renters in the modern times is far greater than ever before. If so, how can we 
really squeeze the influence of functionless financiers on economy? Can an 
economy be money-free? 
The question is not about the money itself but about the role money has 
been entrusted to play. Lapavistas (2003b: 50) rightly mentions what the 
neoclassical economists forget, „money buys goods but is never sold‟. 
Treating money as commodity means particular goods is buying good which 
is absurd. But the neoclassical economists assume that at equilibrium prices, 
agents have no trouble in realizing sale or purchase of commodities because 
all goods, according to this school, are liquid. Consumers can finance their 
purchases of goods indifferently with money or with the supply of labor or 
of other goods. If so, money is distinct from other goods in name but not in 
function. Therefore, the world is frictionless virtual barter. In contrast, 
Marxian tradition views that money is not a substitute of goods or 
commodity. It is misleading to assume that the widespread commodity 
exchange could take place under barter conditions (Lapavitsas, 2003a). 
Lapavitsas (2003a) further argues that there is no evidence that a durable 
system of entirely money-free commodity transactions has ever existed. 
Basically money has broader social functions in a capitalist society, most 
clearly seen in relation to power and hierarchy. Money affords social power, 
since it can impel others to comply with its owner's will, for example, by 
placating opponents, mobilizing supporters, or hiring professional expertise 
(Lapavitsas 2003a: 60). 
Keynes however, advocates for direct taxation on rentiers to bridge the 
income gap by reducing the influence of functionless investors-  
we might aim in practice (there being nothing in this which is 
unattainable) at an increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to 
be scarce, so that the functionless investor will no longer receive a 
bonus; and at a scheme of direct taxation which allows the intelligence 
and determination and executive skill of the financier, the 
entrepreneur et hoc genus omne (who are certainly so fond of their 
craft that their labor could be obtained much cheaper than at present), 
to be harnessed to the service of the community on reasonable terms 
of reward" (Keynes,1936: 345). 
 Keynes repeatedly emphasizes on the role of uncertainty as an 
influencing factor of interest rate. For Keynes interest rate is simply „… the 
reward for running the risk of uncertainty of one kind or another‟. However 
under the recent trend of ugly neologisms –„marketization plus 
financialization‟ (Dore, 2000; Dore, 2011), the orthodox, traditional 
conceptualization of the decision-making process under „measurable‟ 
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uncertainty or risk has gained a total domination of the subject. The Post-
Keynesian and heterodox view on the decision-making under 
„unmeasurable‟ uncertainty a la Knight is nearly dead particularly among the 
practitioners in financial markets. Frank Knight drew a famous distinction 
between „measurable uncertainty‟or„risk‟, which may be represented by 
numerical probabilities and „unmeasurable uncertainty‟ which cannot 
(Knight, 1921; Suzuki, 2011). 
Since the consequences of actions extend into the future, accurate 
forecasting is essential for making objectively rational choices. But in the 
real world, most choices take place under conditions of uncertainty. The 
screening and monitoring actors (the banks as lenders and the investors as 
fund-providers) are working under conditions of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality. This means that monitoring activities are not mechanical, and 
that they are intrinsically based on subjective judgments that are often 
extremely difficult. The fundamental implication of Keynes' uncertainty is 
that all economically meaningful behavior derives from agents' efforts to 
protect themselves from uncertainty (Dymski, 1993). Uncertainty is fairly 
understated in academic arguments on the monitoring activities by the 
monitoring actors. While the functional financiers who challenge to deal 
with various ranges of credit risk under conditions of uncertainty are 
required for our society, it makes sense of the emergence of the function-less 
financiers who pay their efforts to protect themselves from uncertainty. The 
difficulty or inability of responding to the intensified uncertainty must be 
one of root causes of the trend of financialization. 
From the Marxian political-economy perspective, capital is considered as 
the sum total of social relations between capitalists and workers, but also the 
ceaseless movement of value in pursuit of self-expansion. „The latter is best 
thought of as a circular flow; capital value starts as money, becomes material 
inputs for production through market purchases (means of production and 
labor power), turns into finished commodities through production, and 
returns to money (augmented by surplus value generated in production, i.e. 
profit) through sale of finished commodities" (Lapavitsas, 2003a: 67). In the 
trend of financialization, interest-bearing capital (IBC) as represented by M - 
M' circuit where money stands apart from the production process, is also 
considered as the ceaseless movement of value in pursuit of self-expansion. 
On the other hand, IBC represents a claim on surplus value that has yet to be 
produced. In this light, since there can be no guarantee of production and 
appropriation of surplus value, it is hardly surprising that the financial sector 
should be capable of financing overproduction and generating spectacular 
speculative bubbles and equally spectacular crashes. And nor is it surprising 
that the possibility of fraud is ever present, even though „fictitious capital‟ of 
this kind has become increasingly necessary for real accumulation (Fine & 
Saad-Filho, 2004). 
If this Marxian view is held, it seems infeasible to eliminate the role of 
functionless financiers in the movement, while maintaining appropriate 
incentives to the „functional‟ financiers. Or on other words, we cannot tame 
the spirit of financialization down without simply killing „the golden goose‟- 
the rentier; and at the same time, continuous financialization is engulfing the 
real economy. Perhaps, this dilemma can rationalize the partnership strategy 
upon the profit-loss sharing (PLS) between industrial capitalists and money 
capitalists (fund providers) widely observed in Islamic finance. 
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4. Compatibility of Islamic Principles of with 
Heterodox Thinking 
The Marxian view on IBC and merchant's capital is suggestive of 
understanding the Islamic prohibition of Riba. Islam, a religion born in the 
Arabian Desert, where trade constituted the most important, „perhaps even 
the sole economic activity, favors merchants, property rights, free trade and 
market economy‟ (Çizakça, 2011: xv). In this context, Islam is called the 
religion for merchants (Ayub, 2007; Çizakça, 2011). The business ethics in 
the Islamic mode of transactions are related to the civilized urban way of life 
at the birth of Islam. The holy Prophet had spent half of his life working as a 
merchant in Mecca, where the urban culture was flourished and the values 
for facilitating fair transactions among the merchants in equal positions were 
shared. The holy Prophet mentioned that trade constituted nine-tenth of the 
livelihood of early Muslims. In fact, of the four righteous Caliphs, Abu Bakr 
was a cloth merchant and Uthman was an importer of cereals (Çizakça, 
2011: xiv). 
The values being shared among merchants have developed the concept of 
contracting and the importance of respecting mutual property rights in the 
Islam community. Islam recognizes the role of market and the freedom of 
individuals in business and trade while restraining the freedom to engage in 
business and financial transactions on the basis of a number of prohibitions, 
ethics and norms. It is widely known that the prohibition of Riba, Gharar 
and Maisir (gambling) is the most strategic factor that defines invalid and 
voidable contracts and demarcates the overall limits which should not be 
crossed (Ayub, 2007: 12). 
Interest constitutes the major portion of rentiers income and is considered 
a core element of financialization. An examination of world‟s dominant 
religions shows that they all prohibited interest as far as history is concerned. 
The Abrahamic faith traditions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - took 
initial strides to prevent adherents from charging any interest on loans 
(Looft, 2014). While Jewish and Christian have both evolved to draw 
distinctions between acceptable interest and usury, Islam still explicitly 
forbids charging any interest on loans. Usury is referred to as a rate of 
interest greater than that which the law or public opinion permits (Looft 
2014). Looft (2014) points out that nevertheless, there are still voices within 
Christian communities that deride all forms of interest as usury, referring to 
the following poem written by Peter Maurin who co-founded the Catholic 
Worker Movement in 1933; „1. Before John Calvin people were not allowed 
to lend money at interest. 2. John Calvin decided to legalize money-lending 
at interest in spite of the teachings of the Prophets of Israel and the Fathers 
of the Church. 3. Protestant countries tried to keep up with John Calvin and 
money-lending at interest became the general practice. 4. And money ceases 
to be a means of exchange and began to be a means to make money. 5. So 
people lent money on time and started to think of time in terms of money 
and said to each other: “Time is money”‟(Looft, 2014: 114-5). 
While the heterodox perspective is still not sure if the rate of interest 
should be lower and ultimately zero, Islam completely prohibits it. Islam has 
not relented to pressures from the marketplace and has continued to maintain 
its stance that charging interest on loans is usurious and a violation of 
Islamic law. As Looft (2014) points out, the logic behind this is that lending 
money at interest without any means of sharing risk between lender and 
borrower creates a relationship where weak and vulnerable individuals can 
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be easily exploited by more powerful ones. However, the prohibition of riba 
makes it difficult to collect and centralize the temporarily idle money in 
order to transform into potential money capital available to industrial capital. 
The prohibition of riba on the one hand and the difficulty of collecting 
deposit without offering interest on the other result the rise of Islamic 
banking dominated by Shari’ah-compliant asset-based financing including 
murabaha (mark-up contract), bai-muajjal (variant of murabaha), bai-salam 
(forward sale contract), and ijara (leasing) rather than by the dominance of 
profit and loss sharing mudaraba (trust based contract) and musharaka 
(partnership/equity based contract) that are developed by following the 
divine rules prescribed in Islamic Shari’ah (Çizakça, 2011). The current 
profit-loss sharing risk provides an idea of the difficulty in assuming the 
equity-based financing with higher credit risk in practice. As Suzuki & 
Uddin (2014) point out, it is impractical to expect the acceleration of the 
participatory financing without preserving much higher bank rent for Islamic 
banks for covering further Shari’ah profit and loss sharing risk. The Islamic 
logic and ethics are compatible with the Marxian political-economy view on 
money and credit to a great extent. 
Avoiding Gharar is another salient principle of Islamic finance. In the 
Islamic mode of investment and financial intermediation, excessive 
uncertaintyis perceived in two dimensions: one refers to lack of clarity in the 
terms and essence of the contract, the other refers to the uncertainty in the 
object of the contract (Ayub, 2007; El-Gamal, 2006). Complete contracting 
is intrinsically impossible. Therefore, some measure of uncertainty is always 
present in contracts. El-Gamal (2006: 58) notes „jurists distinguished 
between major or excessive Gharar, which invalidates contracts, and minor 
Gharar, which is tolerated as a necessary evil‟. Also, the uncertainty in the 
object of the contract cannot be avoided in any business. „The problem, 
however, was that the extent of uncertainty making any transaction Haram 
had not been clearly defined (Ayub, 2007: 58). Ayub (2007) refers to 
Gharar-e-Kathir and GhararQalil (too much and nominal uncertainty) and 
agrees that only those transactions that involve too much or excessive 
uncertainty in respect of the subject matter should be prohibited. Saati 
(2003) suggests that the Hadith (which prohibits gharar) does not intend to 
prohibit all gharar, but intends to prohibit ghararwhich can cause dispute 
and cannot be tolerated. 
Basically, Islamic principles of economics focus on clarity and lack of 
ambiguity, just and fair treatment or all and care for the rights of others 
(Ayub, 2007). So far as these principles are necessarily ethical, incubating 
small and middle-sized enterprises (SEMs)would be acceptable to an extent 
in which the associated major uncertainty can be shared and absorbed in the 
community through an adequate profit-loss sharing agreement (Suzuki, 
2013). Ayub (n.d: 2) mentions „for a more efficient economy, we must 
promote systems in which people work in productive pursuits rather than 
unproductive ones. Change the system to relate it with real sector activities 
and all those clever dealers who earn huge profits out of thin air could 
become doctors, industrialists, business people and teachers instead‟. This 
provides with the evidence that engagement in enterprise rather than 
speculation seems to be preferably considered in the Islamic mode of 
investment. The prohibition of Gharar in speculation is considered as the 
wisdom for minimizing the potential periodic financial disaster. In parallel, 
under the prohibition of Gharar (also the profit-loss sharing) framework, it 
may have created a dilemma of the so-called „Murabaha syndrome‟ leading 
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to the financial disintermediation (particularly the dry-up of long-term funds) 
in the potentials SMEs. Long-term growth may suffer as a result. Based on 
the best effort to avoid the incompleteness of contract, it might be 
acceptable, to an extent in which the associated major uncertainty in 
enterprise can be shared and absorbed in the community through an 
adequate profit-loss sharing agreement, to incubate small and micro-
enterprises in agricultural and industrial sectors (Suzuki, 2013). How Islamic 
financial institutions will tackle the Murabaha syndrome while improving 
the financial intermediation to industrial potentials should be further argued. 
 In parallel, it is worth arguing that the wisdom in the prohibition of 
Gharar can possibly squeeze function-less financiers in the financial 
derivatives and hedge-products market. In this context we find Marx‟s labor 
theory of value very sympathetic. Prohibition of riba and indirectly 
prohibition of gharar in the Islamic mode would to some extent restrain the 
rate of exploitation. Probably, the rate of profit in the Islamic mode would be 
accordingly restrained. The circulation of M-C-M' or M-M' in the Islamic 
mode is considered slower than that in the capitalist mode. On the one hand, 
the Islamic principles are contributing to squeezing the „function-less‟ 
financiers by not giving them the opportunity of exploiting. On the other 
hand, the Islamic principles are less contributing to incubating the 
„functional‟ financiers who have the partner's strategy in the participatory 
financing for incubating new industries. 
Islamic banks mobilize deposits on the basis of profit-and-loss sharing 
agreement and to some extent on the basis of Wakalahagainst pre-agreed 
service charges or agency fees. While sharing profit or loss arising on 
investments, they earn a return on their trading and leasing activities by dint 
of the risk and liability undertaken and adding value in real business 
activities (Ayub, 2007). On the other hand, the following threat and 
sanctions mechanisms encourage prudent screening and monitoring. First, 
Shari’ahrules are the cornerstone of Islamic financial products and services. 
If depositors or customers become aware that the products they have in their 
portfolios are not Shari’ah-compliant, it would seriously undermine 
customer confidence in the Islamic bank concerned or, on a larger scale, in 
the Islamic financial services industry as a whole (Bhambra, 2007: 204-5). 
Second, a prudent or conservative credit screening policy is required to 
reduce the probability of loss, particularly in the case of mudaraba- or 
musharaka-based financing. Third, risk-averse depositors will look for low-
risk forms of financing, for instance, murabaha and other similar asset-
backed financing. In this context, El-Gamal (2006) refers to what Islamic 
finance practitioners call „displaced commercial risk‟. This may arise if 
Islamic bank depositors suffer a loss compared with conventional bank 
depositors and therefore, withdraw their funds from the Islamic bank (El-
Gamal, 2006:155). Fourth, strict practice of profit-and-loss sharing principle 
is a rarity in Islamic banking operations and in most cases the return for the 
depositors is homogenous for all banks irrespective of their scales of 
profitability (Chong & Liu, 2009; Farook & Farooq, 2011, Zaher & Hasan, 
2001). It is highly likely that some Islamic banks are hesitant to share losses 
with their depositors maintaining their franchise value as prudent monitors to 
avoid the displaced commercial risk. Credit risk is similar to conventional 
banking, but credit risk management and recovery process are far more 
complicated in the Islamic banking system than in conventional banking (El 
Tiby, 2011). Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks have to absorb not 
only the credit risk but also the risk associated with the compliance of 
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Islamic Shari’ah, that is, Shari’ah risk. Accordingly, in addition to the 
difference between the rates of profit received and profit paid (borrowing 
rate and lending rate respectively in conventional banking), Islamic banks 
need an extra cushion to absorb the unexpected loss and the transaction costs 
associated with the Shari’ah compliance to maintain the franchise value. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
We have attempted, in this paper, to link three prominent issues relevant 
to the financial world today – the causes and consequences of 
financialization, the heterodox perspective on the concerned issues and the 
compatibility of heterodox school to Islamic prohibition of Riba and Gharar. 
Following financial liberalization, the world economy relied too much on 
financing activities leaving the real economy behind. This trend has paved 
the way for innovation of new financial products and instruments enticing 
increased number of players to capitalize on these instruments. At its peak, 
financing activities expanded to such an astronomical level that the real 
economy could not afford to sustain it. The eventual burst of bubble left the 
world into complete disarray resulting decline in consumer wealth estimated 
to be trillions of dollars accompanied by prolonged unemployment. We have 
argued that financialization facilitated the emergence of a new capitalist 
class that has been able to influence and capitalize on monetary policy 
particularly the interest rate. Moreover, the tendency to transform 
fundamental uncertainty into risk through technological innovation has 
enabled firms to gamble without limit. These two elements we have 
examined shedding analytical lights on the heterodox school. 
 In spite of their enormous importance for contemporary capitalism, 
Marxian studies of money and finance have progressed relatively slowly, 
with little generally being said about the more fundamental issues of the 
nature of finance and the relationship between financial and industrial 
capital. Many of the questions Marx asked seem surprisingly suggestive of 
transcending the trend of financialization. Particularly his concept on the role 
of money is an essential element to be considered in determining the level of 
financial activities in relation to real economy. Moreover, Keynes' 
discussion on fundamental uncertainty is closely associated with the function 
of money. We have argued drawing on Marxian and the economics of 
Keynes that money is the cornerstone of all social endeavors as opposed to 
an elemental state of barter viewed by the neoclassical school. 
These two elements – interest and uncertainty- are the core principles of 
Islamic finance. Though Keynes' ideology is not certain if the interest rate 
can be zero, Islam is outspoken about zero rate of interest. It prohibits all 
sorts of ribaandgharar and encourages profit-and-loss sharing based 
financial contract instead. It is unfair in the view of Islam that the capitalist 
class would enjoy guaranteed return while the entrepreneurs suffer from 
fundamental uncertainty associated with futures. It is the uncertainty for 
which Keynes argues for positive interest rate. However, the existence of 
uncertainty on the one hand and the non-existence of interest on the other 
make it difficult for Islamic financial institutions to mobilize deposits and 
expand loans. This has resulted the concentration of Islamic 
Murabahafinancing instead of true profit and loss sharing contract. An 
extended explanation on the so-called Murabaha syndrome and its possible 
solutions are the issues we keep for our future discussion. 
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